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OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Mauricio Valdiviezo-Galdamez petitions for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his
appeal from an Immigration Judge’s order denying his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under
Article III of the Convention Against Torture. For the reasons
that follow, we will grant the petition for review on the asylum
and withholding of removal applications and remand for further
proceedings; we will deny the petition for review on the claim
for relief under the Convention Against Torture.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
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The facts are taken from our opinion on Valdiviezo(continued...)
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Mauricio Edgardo Valdiviezo-Galdamez was born in
May 1984, and is a native and citizen of Honduras. He came to
the United States in October 2004 without being admitted or
paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Removal
proceedings were initiated against him in January 2005. During
those proceedings, Valdiviezo-Galdamez admitted removability,
but submitted an application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under Article III of the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”), as noted above.
At the ensuing removal hearing before an Immigration
Judge, Valdiviezo-Galdamez testified that he fled Honduras
because members of a gang called “Mara Salvatrucha,” a/k/a
“MS-13,” had threatened to kill him if he did not join their
gang. Valdiviezo-Galdamez testified that the gang engages in
drug trafficking and, on occasion, commits murder. According
to Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the gang members began threatening
him in March 2003, when he was living in the city of San Pedro
Sula in Honduras. On one occasion six men approached
Valdiviezo-Galdamez and robbed him as he was leaving work.
They told him that he would have to join their gang to get his
money and jewelry back. When he refused, the men hit him and
told him that he better think about their “proposal.” ValdiviezoGaldamez knew that the men were members of Mara
Salvatrucha because they had tattoos that were characteristic of

1

(...continued)
Galdamez’s prior petition for review. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Attorney General (“Valdiviezo-Galdamez I”), 502 F.3d 285,
286-287 (3d Cir. 2007).
4

gang membership.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez waited three days before reporting
the incident to the police because he was afraid to leave his
house. After this incident, he moved to live with his mother in
Santa Rosa de Cupon because he was afraid the gang would
come after him if he remained in San Pedro Sula. He did not
leave his mother’s house during the three months he stayed in
Santa Rosa. He returned to San Pedro Sula in June 2003
because he received a job offer. He testified that he did not
think that he could find work in Santa Rosa because the village
is largely agricultural and most people are farmers. In addition,
he was afraid to stay in Santa Rosa because some of his former
classmates who lived there were gang members and he feared
that they would discover his presence.
After Valdiviezo-Galdamez returned to San Pedro Sula,
he moved to a different colony within the city in an attempt to
avoid members of Mara Salvatrucha. However, gang members
soon spotted him and renewed their threats. They shot at him,
and threw rocks and spears at him about two-to-three times a
week. When he ran, they would shout after him: “Don’t run.
Don’t be afraid. Sooner or later you will join us.” He was able
to identify some of the men, either by the gang nicknames
inscribed in their tattoos or because they addressed one another
by those nicknames. Valdiviezo-Galdamez filed five separate
police reports about these incidents, but claimed he received no
response from the police.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez testified that he was in a two car
caravan on his way to visit his sister’s husband in Guatemala,
5

in September, 2004, when he and his fellow passengers in one
of the cars were kidnapped by members of Mara Salvatrucha
after crossing the border into Guatemala. They were taken into
the mountains where the kidnappers asked ValdiviezoGaldamez what he was doing in Guatemala. He told them that
he was only traveling, but his abductors thought he was trying
to escape recruitment into their gang. Valdiviezo-Galdamez
testified that they told him they were no longer offering him the
option of joining their gang, and had decided to kill him
instead. They then tied Valdiviezo-Galdamez up and beat him
for five hours.
He was eventually freed by the Guatemalan police who
had been alerted by family members who were traveling behind
Valdiviezo-Galdamez and had not been spotted by the
attackers. Valdiviezo-Galdamez filed a complaint with the
Guatemalan police, but they simply said that it was not their
problem since he wasn’t from Guatemala. ValdiviezoGaldamez remained in Guatemala briefly with his sister’s
husband, and then decided to come to the United States to
escape the gang. He testified that he believes that the gang
members will kill him and attack his family if he returns to
Honduras and continues to resist gang recruitment.
In his asylum application, Valdiviezo-Galdamez alleged
that he had been persecuted in Honduras on account of his
membership in a particular social group, that he had suffered
persecution on account of his political opinion and that he had
a well-founded fear that such persecution would continue if he
were returned to Honduras.
6

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 15, 2005, after a hearing, the Immigration Judge
denied Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s applications for relief although
he found no reason to disbelieve Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s
testimony. The IJ suggested three failures of proof. The IJ
concluded that Valdiviezo-Galdamez had not established that
the government refused to protect him from the attacks by the
Mara Salvatrucha members and that the refusal was on account
of one of the five grounds enumerated in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), i.e., his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
Second, the IJ found that Valdiviezo-Galdamez failed to
establish that he had been injured on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion. Third, the IJ noted that Valdiviezo-Galdamez
had lived in Santa Rosa without problems and faulted him for
failing to establish that the danger of persecution at the hands of
the gang members was country-wide.2 The IJ also found that
Valdiviezo-Galdamez presented no evidence that he would be
tortured if returned to Honduras.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez appealed that ruling to the Board

2

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (“An applicant does
not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant
could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the
applicant's country of nationality ... if under all the
circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant
to do so.”).
7

of Immigration Appeals. In his brief to the BIA, he argued,
inter alia, that he belonged to the “particular social group” of
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but
have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.” On
February 27, 2006, the BIA rejected the argument and
summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez then filed his first petition for
review with this court. We granted the petition, vacated the
BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General (“ValdiviezoGaldamez I”), 502 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2007). We held, in
pertinent part, that substantial evidence did not support the IJ’s
determination that Valdiviezo-Galdamez had failed to establish
that the harm he suffered in Honduras was on account of his
membership in the group consisting of young men who had
been recruited by gangs and had refused to join. Id. at 290. We
remanded to the BIA for it to address the threshold question of
whether “young men who have been actively recruited by gangs
and who have refused to join the gangs” is a “particular social
group” within the meaning of the INA - an issue that neither the
IJ nor the BIA had decided – and which we declined to decide
in the first instance. Id. We also directed the BIA to address
whether the injures that Valdiviezo-Galdamez suffered rose to
the level of persecution. Id. at 291. In addition, we held that
the IJ erred in his analysis of whether Valdiviezo-Galdamez
could safely relocate within Honduras. Id. at 291-92. Finally,
we held that the IJ erred in denying the application for relief
under the CAT because the IJ ignored relevant evidence and
remanded for consideration of the relevant evidence in light of
our decision in Silva-Rengifo v. Attorney General, 473 F.3d 58
8

(3d Cir. 2007). Id. at 292-93. There, we addressed the standard

for proving government acquiescence to torture.
On remand, the BIA again rejected ValdiviezoGaldamez’s claims.3 The BIA concluded that Valdiviezo-

Galdamez failed to show that he had experienced past
persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution
“on account of” a classification that is protected under the INA.

3

Valdiviezo-Galdamez was represented by Nicole
Simon at his first hearing before the IJ, as well as in his first
appeal to the BIA. He was also represented by counsel,
Martin P. Duffey and Ayodele Gansallo, on his first petition
for review with us. After we remanded, the BIA sent a notice
of remand to Valdiviezo-Galdamez and Simon advising them
that the case had been put on the docket for adjudication and
that if Valdiviezo-Galdamez wished to be represented by
counsel, that representative must file a new entry of
appearance unless that one had already been filed. However,
no entry of appearance was filed. Only the government filed
a brief after the remand.
The BIA’s October 22, 2008 decision following
remand stated that he had appeared pro se. However, prior
to the BIA’s decision, Gansallo, who had not entered an
appearance with the BIA after remand, and did not seek an
opportunity to file a brief, sent a September 23, 2008, letter to
the BIA advising the BIA that it was required to consider the
social group issues on remand. The BIA did send a courtesy
copy of its October 22, 2008 decision to Gansallo.
9

App. 10-11. The BIA also noted that it had decided the
“closely analogous” case of Matter of S-E-G., 24 I. & N. Dec.
579 (BIA 2008), after we remanded Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s
petition for review. App. 11. In Matter of S-E-G, the BIA held
that Salvadoran youth who were subjected to recruitment efforts
by the Mara Salvatrucha, and who resisted gang membership
“based on their own personal, moral and religious opposition to
the gang’s values and activities,” did not constitute a “particular
social group.” Id. at 579.
In again rejecting ValdiviezoGaldamez’s claim, the BIA relied on Matter of S-E-G and its
companion case, Matter of E-A-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA
2008). The BIA concluded that it had previously held that a
“particular social group” is a group whose members share a
common, immutable characteristic that members either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. App.
11. In Matter of E-A-G, the Board concluded that it would give
“greater specificity” to that test by adding the concepts of
“particularity” and “social visibility.” Id.
Here, as in Matter of S-E-G, the BIA reasoned that the
proposed “particular social group” of “Honduran youth who
have been actively recruited by gangs but have refused to join
because they oppose gangs” lacked “particularity” because it
was a “potentially large and diffuse segment of society” and
“too broad and inchoate” to qualify for relief under the INA.
App. 11. The BIA believed that the proposed social group
lacked “social visibility” as required under Matter of E-A-G
because persons who resist gangs were not shown to be socially
visible or a recognizable group or segment of Honduran society,
and the risk of harm Valdiviezo-Galdamez feared was actually
10

an individualized gang reaction to his specific behavior.4 App.
11.
The BIA also concluded that Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s
claim of persecution on account of political opinion was
foreclosed by INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
There, the Supreme Court held that a guerrilla organization’s
attempt to conscript a Guatemalan native into its military did not
necessarily constitute persecution on account of political
opinion. However, the Court did not there address the issue of
whether the alien could qualify for asylum as a member of a
particular social group because he argued that his opposition
was a “political opinion” that qualified for relief. The Court
rejected that proposition because the alien did not establish that
he would be prosecuted because of that political opinion and not
“because of his refusal to fight.” Id. at 483.
In rejecting Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s appeal, the BIA
reasoned that although he claimed to fear gang retaliation, he
“failed to show a political motive in resisting gang recruitment
or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his
political opinion.” App. 12. The BIA noted that there was “no

4

Because the BIA found that Honduran youth who
have been recruited by gangs but have refused to join because
they oppose gangs was not a “particular social group” within
the meaning of the INA, it did not have to decide whether the
government was unable or unwilling to protect ValdiviezoGaldamez or whether Valdiviezo-Galdamez could have safely
relocated within Honduras.
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evidence” that Valdiviezo-Galdamez was “politically active” or
made any “anti-gang political statements.” Id. According to the
BIA, Valdiviezo-Galdamez did not provide any evidence that
the gang “imputed, or would impute to him, an anti-gang
political opinion, or would be interested in him for any reason
other than to simply increas[e] their ranks.” Id.

The BIA also denied Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s CAT claim
because he failed to show past conduct rising to the level of
torture. In addition, even assuming arguendo, that he had
established it was “more likely than not” that he would be
tortured by the gang, the Board reasoned that he had not
established that the torture would be inflicted with the
acquiescence of a public official. Id. at 13.
This petition for review followed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of questions of law is de novo. Kamara v.
Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2005). We
review the BIA’s statutory interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act under the deferential standard set forth in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2003).
Under that analytical framework, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous about an issue, we must determine if the agency’s
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993). We
review the Board’s findings of fact under the “substantial
evidence” standard, Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186
12

(3d Cir. 2003). We can only reverse the Board’s decision if
“any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). See INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
IV. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Asylum and withholding of removal.
Section 208 of the INA gives the Attorney General
discretion to grant asylum to removable aliens. 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a). However, that relief can only be granted if the
applicant is a “refugee.” Id. “[R]efugee” is defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any
country of such person’s
nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is
outside of any country in which
such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because
of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, an alien’s ability to
establish that s/he is entitled to relief as a refugee turns on
whether s/he can establish persecution “on account of” one of
the five statutory grounds. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478
13

(1992).
An applicant who establishes past persecution is “entitled
to a presumption that his[/her] life or freedom will be threatened
if [s/]he returns.” Gabuniya v. Attorney General, 463 F.3d 316,
321 (3d Cir. 2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1). Where an
applicant is unable to demonstrate that s/he has been the victim
of past persecution, the applicant nonetheless becomes eligible
for asylum upon demonstrating a well-founded fear of future
persecution if returned to his/her native country. See
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).
The well-found fear of persecution standard involves both a
subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively
reasonable possibility of persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987). The subjective prong requires a
showing that the fear is genuine. Mitey v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325,
1331 (7th Cir. 1995). Determining whether the fear of
persecution is objectively reasonable requires ascertaining
whether a reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances would
fear persecution if returned to a given country. Chang v. INS,
119 F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1997). If
If the persecution was not conducted directly by the
government or its agents, the petitioner must also establish that
it was conducted “by forces the government is unable or
unwilling to control.” Kibinda v. Attorney General., 477 F.3d
113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007).
Withholding of removal is mandatory if “the Attorney
General determines that [the] alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened” on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. §
14

1253(h)(1) (re-codified, as amended, at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)).
To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must establish
a “clear probability of persecution,” i.e., that it is more likely
than not, that s/he would suffer persecution upon returning
home. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). Since
this standard is more demanding than that governing eligibility
for asylum, an alien who fails to qualify for asylum is
necessarily ineligible foI wir withholding of removal. Zhang v.
Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1995).
B. Relief under the CAT.
“An applicant for relief on the merits under [Article III]
of the Convention Against Torture bears the burden of
establishing ‘that it is more likely than not that he or she would
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-175 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). “The United States Senate
specified this standard, as well as many of the other standards
that govern relief under the Convention, in several
‘understandings’ that it imposed on the United States’
ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” Id. at 175
(citations omitted). “The standard for relief has no subjective
component, but instead requires the alien to establish, by
objective evidence, that [s/]he is entitled to relief.” Id. (citation
and internal quotations omitted). The alien’s testimony, if
credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration. Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th
Cir. 2000) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). If an alien meets his
or her burden of proof, withholding of removal or deferring of
removal is mandatory. INA § 241(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 15

208.18.
Under the implementing regulations for the Convention:
Torture is defined as an act by
which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining
from him or her or a third person
information or a confession,
punishing him or her for an act he
or she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or her or a third
person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
“[T]he regulations clearly state that there is no
acquiescence to torture unless the relevant officials know about
the torture before it occurs.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 176 (citing
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)) (emphasis in original). In SilvaRengifo v. Attorney General, 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 2007), we
held that “acquiescence to torture [as used in the regulation]
16

requires only that government officials remain willfully blind to
torturous conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent
it.”
The regulations also provide:

(3) In assessing whether it is more
likely than not that an applicant
would be tortured in the proposed
country of removal, all evidence
relevant to the possibility of future
torture shall be considered,
including, but not limited to:
(i) Evidence of past torture
inflicted upon the applicant;
(ii) Evidence that the applicant
could relocate to a part of the
country of removal where he or she
is not likely to be tortured;
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights
within the country of removal,
where applicable; and
(iv) Other relevant information
regarding conditions in the country
of removal.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). “[C]ountry conditions alone can play
a decisive role [in determining if relief is warranted]. . . [and]
the law does not require that the prospective risk of torture be

17

on account of certain protected grounds.”5 Kamalthas v. INS,
251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001).
“Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel and
inhuman treatment or punishment that do not amount to
torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2). Therefore, “even cruel and
inhuman behavior by government officials may not implicate
the torture regulations.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175. “[T]orture
covers intentional governmental acts, not negligent acts or acts
by private individuals not acting on behalf of the government.”
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 299 (BIA 2002). The BIA has
also held that “[v]iolence committed by individuals over whom
the government has no reasonable control does not implicate”
relief under the CAT. In re Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
270, 280 (BIA 2002). Similarly:
the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant, or mass violations of human rights in a
particular country does not, as such, constitute a
sufficient ground for determining that a particular
person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture upon his or her return to that country.
Specific grounds must exist that indicate that the
individual would be personally at risk
.

5

Because the risk of torture does not need to be on
account of certain protected grounds, “the inability to state a
cognizable asylum claim does not necessarily preclude relief
under the [CAT].” Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1280.
18

In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1313 (BIA 2000).
V. DISCUSSION

Although we will address each of the arguments
Valdiviezo-Galdamez makes in support of his petition for
review, his principal claim is clearly that the BIA erred by
requiring “particularity” and “social visibility” to establish that
he is a member of a particular social group. He argues that is
contrary to, and inconsistent with, the text of the INA.
Before we can address the merits of this claim, we must
first address the government’s claim that we have no
jurisdiction to consider Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s challenge to the
BIA’s requirements that a group must have “particularity” and
“social visibility” to constitute a “particular social group.” The
government argues that we cannot reach the merits because
Valdiviezo-Galdamez failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to that issue.
The government notes that in May 2008, the BIA
notified Valdiviezo-Galdamez of its briefing schedule on
remand, but Valdiviezo-Galdamez did not file a brief. The
government also notes that Ayodele Gansallo, who had
represented Valdiviezo-Galdamez on his prior petition for
review, did send the BIA a letter in September 2008 advising
the Board that it was required to consider the social group
issues on remand. See n.3, supra. However, Gansallo neither
entered an appearance nor filed a brief addressing the issues
raised by the Board’s discussion of “particular social group” in
Matter of S-E-G, supra, and Matter of E-A-G, supra. As we
19

have explained, in those cases, the Board rejected claims for
asylum on account of being a member of a particular social
group based on the aliens’ opposition to gang recruitment.
Thus, the government believes that Valdiviezo-Galdamez
“failed to present his challenges to the [BIA’s] interpretation of
‘particular social group’ articulated in its 2006-2008
decisions.”6 Government’s Br. at 18. Accordingly, the
government contends that we have no jurisdiction because
Valdiviezo-Galdamez failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because he did not challenge the BIA’s “particular
social group” analysis in his petition for review.
Prior to raising an issue for judicial review, a petitioner
must exhaust all administrative remedies available as of right
regarding that issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Sandie v. Att’y
Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009). The government is
correct in arguing that this is a jurisdictional requirement. See
Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]ssue
exhaustion as required by § 1252(d)(1) is a jurisdictional rule.”).
Requiring petitioners to raise all issues before the BIA permits
the agency “to resolve a controversy or correct its own errors
before judicial intervention.” Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d
442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005).

6

In Matter of S-E-G, the BIA noted that in 2006
through 2008, it had rendered decisions that “membership in a
purported social group requires that the group have particular
and well-defined boundaries, and that it possesses a
recognized level of social visibility.” 24 I. & N. at 582.
20

It is undisputed that Valdiviezo-Galdamez did not
address the BIA’s “particular social group” analysis, i.e., its
requirements for “particularity” and “social visibility,”
following our remand to the BIA. However, that does not
automatically deprive us of jurisdiction now. In Lin v. Attorney
General, 543 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2008), we held that “the BIA’s
consideration of an issue is sufficient to provide us with
jurisdiction over that issue” even if the petitioner fails to raise
the issue before the BIA. 543 F.3d at 123 n.7. Here, the BIA
held that the “particular social group” proposed by ValdiviezoGaldamez did not qualify for asylum consideration because it
lacked “particularty” and “social visibility.” Since the BIA
raised the issue sua sponte, we have jurisdiction over
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s challenge to the BIA’s requiring
“particularity” and “social visibility” as a condition precedent to
qualifying for relief from removal. Accordingly, we will address
the merits of his claim that he is a member of a particular social
group for purposes of establishing that he is a “refugee.”
1. The BIA erred in denying the
application for asylum.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez makes three arguments in support
of his contention that the BIA erred in denying his application
for asylum. We consider each separately.
A. The BIA erred by applying a new standard to
determine
membership in a “particular social group.”
To

understand this argument, some background
21

information is necessary. As noted above, pursuant to INA §
208, an alien must establish not only that s/he has been
persecuted in the country of origin, but that such persecution
was “on account of” one of the grounds specified in that statute.
As also noted above, Valdiviezo-Galdamez is arguing that he is
entitled to relief based on persecution on account of his
membership in “a particular social group.”
In Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), we wrote:
Both courts and commentators have
struggled to define “particular
social group.” Read in its broadest
literal sense, the phrase is almost
completely open-ended. Virtually
any set including more than one
person could be described as a
“particular social group.” Thus, the
statutory language standing alone is
not very instructive.
Id. at 1238 (footnotes omitted). The concept is even more
elusive because there is no clear evidence of legislative intent.
Id. at 1239. We explained in Fatin, that the “phrase ‘particular
social group’ was first placed in the INA when Congress
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980,” but the legislative history of
the Refugee Act “does not reveal what, if any, specific meaning
the members of Congress attached to the phrase. . .[,]” other
than to make it clear that Congress intended “to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . to which
the United States acceded in 1968.” Id. (footnote and citations
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omitted). Thus, in Fatin, we reasoned that it was “appropriate
to consider what the phrase ‘particular social group’ was
understood to mean in the Protocol.” Id.
Article I of the Protocol generally
adopted the definition of a
“refugee” contained in Article I of
the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.
This latter provision defined a
“refugee” using terms – i.e., “race,
religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group or political
opinion” – virtually identical to
those now incorporated in the INA.
W hen the C onfe rence of
Plenipotentiaries was considering
the Convention in 1951, the phrase
“membership in a particular social
group” was added to this definition
as an “afterthought.” The Swedish
representative proposed this
language, explaining only that it
was needed because “experience
has shown that certain refugees had
been persecuted because they
belonged to particular social
groups,” and the proposal was
adopted.
Thus, neither the
legislative history of the relevant
United States statutes nor the
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negotiating history of the pertinent
international agreements sheds
much light on the meaning of the
phrase “particular social group.”
Id. (citations omitted).
From 1985 until 2006, the BIA issued a number of
decisions dealing with the meaning of “particular social group.”
The BIA first interpreted the phrase in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter
of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 201 (BIA 1985). There, the
alien argued that voluntary members of a taxi cab cooperative
who refused to yield to anti-government guerrillas in El
Salvador constituted a “particular social group.” The guerrillas
“targeted small businesses in the transportation industry for
work stoppages, in hopes of damaging El Salvador’s economy.”
19 I. & N. Dec. at 216. The BIA rejected that claim. It noted
that the UN Protocol refers to race, religion, nationality and
political opinion, as well as membership in a particular social
group. It then applied the principle of ejusdem generis,7 and

7

“(T)he ‘ejusdem generis rule’ is, that where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things in the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned. The rule, however, does
not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in
(continued...)
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interpreted “persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group” as used in the INA
to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable
characteristic.
The shared
characteristic might be an innate
one such as sex, color, or kinship
ties, or in some circumstances it
might be a shared past experience
such as former military leadership
or land ownership. The particular
kind of group characteristic that
will qualify under this construction
remains to be determined on a caseby-case basis. However, whatever
the common characteristic that
defines the group, it must be one
that the members of the group

7

(...continued)
its scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor does
it apply when the context manifests a contrary intention.”
United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 n.10 (3d Cir.
1975) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 608 (Rev. 4th ed.
1968).
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either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences.
Id. at 233-34. The BIA reasoned that the proffered group was
not a “particular social group” within the meaning of the INA
because the identifying characteristic (being a taxi driver who
refused to participate in guerilla-sponsored work stoppages) was
not immutable. The taxi drivers could avoid any persecution by
changing jobs or acceding to the guerrillas’ demands to
participate in work stoppages, and the BIA did not consider
either fundamental to identity or conscience. Id. at 234.
In subsequent cases, the BIA relied upon Acosta in

finding that a number of groups constituted a “particular social
group” under the INA. In Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec.
658 (BIA 1988), the BIA held that “former members of the
national police of El Salvador” could form a “particular social
group” because the alien’s status as a former policeman is “an
immutable characteristic, as it is one beyond the capacity of the
[alien] to change.” Id. at 662. In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20
I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990), the BIA held that homosexuals in
Cuba could constitute a “particular social group” because the
Cuban government required homosexuals to register, report
regularly and to undergo physical examinations and that “once
registered by the Cuban government as a homosexual, that
characteristic [was not] subject to change.” Id. at 821-23. In In
re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996), the BIA found a
familial sub-clan in Somalia to be a “particular social group.”
The BIA explained: “The record before us makes clear not only
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that the Marehan share ties of kinship, but that they are
identifiable as a group based upon linguistic commonalities.”
Id. at 343. In In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA
1996), the BIA found a “particular social group” to be “young
women of the Tchamba-Kunsunto Tribe who had not had been
subjected to FGM [female genital mutilation] as practiced by
that tribe, and who oppose the practice.” Id. at 365. The BIA
reasoned:
In accordance with Acosta, the
particular social group is defined
by common characteristics that
members of the group cannot
change, or should not be required
t o c h an g e b ec a u s e s u c h
characteristics are fundamental to
their individual identities. The
characteristics of being a “young
woman” and a “member of the
Tchamba-Kunsunto Tribe” cannot
be changed. The characteristic of
having intact genitalia is one so
fundamental to the individual
identity of a young woman
that she should not be required to change it.
Id. at 366. In In re V-T-S, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792 (BIA 1997), the
BIA found that “Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry”
constituted a “particular social group” because the
characteristics of being a Filipino of mixed Filipino-Chinese
ancestry “are . . . immutable.” Id. at 798. The BIA also relied
on country reports that showed that “[a]pproximately 1.5
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percent of the Philippine population has an identifiable Chinese
background.” Id.
However, in Matter of Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA
1988), the BIA held that the group of “young, male, unenlisted,
urban Salvadorans” was not a “particular social group” because
the factors which identify the group “are not factors that are
‘fundamental to individual identity or conscience.’” Id. at 57475.
In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec 906 (BIA 1999),8 the BIA
began to add to its interpretation of the term “particular social
group” as enunciated in Acosta. The asylum applicant was a

8

In re R-A was later vacated by the Attorney General in
anticipation of new rules. In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906
(A.G. Jan. 19, 2001). The proposed rule sought comment
about, inter alia, whether or not claims involving domestic
violence might be “conceptualized and evaluated within the
framework of asylum law.” Government’s Br. at 27 n.7.
Ultimately, the Attorney General directed the BIA to refer the
case to him for review, and remanded the case to the BIA for
reconsideration because no final rule had been issued. Id. In
doing so, the Attorney General recognized the four new
decisions of the BIA concerning “particular social group,” all
of which rested upon the analysis of In re R-A. Id. We
discuss those cases below; however, because the BIA’s
language in In re R-A is so important to the claim before us
here, we take the liberty of quoting the BIA’s reasoning in In
re R-A at length.
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Guatemalan woman who was the victim of horrific domestic
violence. The IJ found that the applicant had been persecuted
because of her membership in the particular social group of
“Guatemalan women who have been intimately involved with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination.” Id. at 911. The BIA rejected that
grouping as qualifying for relief under the INA. The BIA
explained that the group the IJ accepted:
appears to have been defined
principally, if not exclusively, for
purposes of this asylum case, and
without regard to the question of
whether anyone in Guatemala
perceives this group to exist in any
form whatsoever. . . [T]he group is
defined largely in the abstract. It
seems to bear little or no relation to
the way in which Guatemalans
might identify subdivisions within
their own society or otherwise
perceive individuals to possess or
lack an important characteristic or
trait. The proposed group may
satisfy the basic requirement of
containing an immutable or
fundamental individual
characteristic. But, for the group to
be viable for asylum purposes, we
believe there must also be some
showing of how the characteristic
is understood in the alien’s society,
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such that we, in turn, may
understand that the potential
persecutors in fact see persons
sharing the characteristic as
warranting suppression or the
infliction of harm.
Id. at 918 (emphasis added). In referring to its prior reliance on
the doctrine of ejusdem generis in Acosta, the BIA explained:
[W]e have ruled that the term
“particular social group” is to be
construed in keeping with the other
four statutory characteristics that
are the focus of persecution: race,
religion, nationality, and political
opinion.
These other four
characteristics are ones that
typically separate various factions
within countries. . ..
In the present case, the [applicant]
has shown that women living with
abusive partners face a variety of
legal and practical problems in
obtaining protection or in leaving
the abusive relationship. But, the
[applicant] has not shown that
“Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions,
who believe that women are to live
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under male domination” is a group
that is recognized and understood
to be a societal faction, or is
otherwise a recognized segment of
the population, in Guatemala. The
[applicant] has shown neither that
the victims of spouse abuse view
themselves as members of this
group, nor, most importantly, that
their male oppressors see their
victimized companions as part of
this group. . ..
if the alleged persecutor is not even
aware of the group’s existence, it
becomes harder to understand how
the persecutor may have been
motivated by the victim’s
“membership” in the group to
inflict the harm.
The [applicant’s] showing fails in
another respect, one that is
noteworthy in our ruling of Matter
of Kasinga. She has not shown
that spouse abuse itself is an
important societal attribute, or, in
other words, that the characteristic
of being abused is one that is
important within Guatemalan
society. The [applicant] has shown
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official tolerance of her husband’s
cruelty toward her. But, for “social
group” purposes, she has not
shown that women are expected by
society to be abused, or that there
are any adverse societal
consequences to women or their
husbands if the women are not
abused. While not determinative,
the prominence or importance of a
characteristic within a society is
another factor bearing on whether
we will recognize that factor as
part of a “particular social group”
under our refugee provisions. If a
characteristic is important in a
given society, it is more likely that
distinctions will be drawn within
that society between those who
share and those who do not share
the characteristic.
***
The starting point for “social
group” analysis remains the
existence of an immutable or
fundamental individual
characteristic in accordance with
Matter of Acosta.
We never
declared, however, that the starting
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point for assessing social group
claims articulated in Acosta was
also the ending point. The factors
we look to in this case, beyond
Acosta’s “immutableness” test, are
not prerequisites, and we do not
rule out the use of additional
considerations that may properly
bear on whether a social group
should be recognized in an
individual case. But these factors
are consistent with the operation of
the other four grounds for asylum
and are therefore appropriate, in
our judgment, for consideration in
the “particular social group”
context.

Id. at 918-20 (emphasis added).
While the BIA was deciding whether social groups
proposed by asylum applicants constituted a “particular social
group” under the INA, various courts of appeals were also
trying to make sense of the concept. In Fatin v. INS, supra, we
held that the BIA’s construction of the term “particular social
group” in Matter of Acosta was a permissible construction of
the Immigration and Nationality Act and, therefore, entitled to
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Chevron deference.9 12 F.3d at 1240. Accordingly, we adopted
that construction.10 Id. Applying the Acosta construction, we
recognized as a “particular social group” a group “consist[ing]
of Iranian women who [found] their country’s gender-specific
laws offensive and [did] not wish to comply with them.” Id. at
1241. However, we affirmed the BIA’s denial of relief because
the alien had not established the requisite persecution. Id. at
1243.
Following our adoption of the Acosta construction, we
held that the group of former child soldiers who had escaped a
guerrilla organization’s army constitutes a “particular social
group” within the meaning of the INS. Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 157, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003). However, we held that
homeless street children in Honduras did not. Escobar v.

9

In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-50
(1987), the Supreme Court held that the BIA’s interpretation
of the Refugee Act is entitled to deference pursuant to the
standards set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10

Several other courts of appeals have adopted the
Acosta construction. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187,
1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d
533, 546-48 (6th Cir. 2003); Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d
596, 603 (7th Cir. 2002); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d
1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640
(8th Cir. 1994); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.
1993).
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Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005). In Escobar, we
explained: “Poverty, homelessness and youth are far too vague
and all encompassing to be characteristics that set the perimeters
for a protected group within the scope of the [INA].” Id. at
367.
Other courts of appeals have used variations of the
Acosta interpretation of “particular social group.” The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has defined it as:
[A] collection of people closely
affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse
or interest. Of central concern is
the existence of a voluntary
associational relationship among
the purported members, which
imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to
their identity as a member of that
discrete social group.
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).11

11

The Ninth Circuit later recognized that groups
sharing immutable characteristics, such as familial identity or
sexual identity, could also be considered social groups within
the meaning of the INA. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d
1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a “‘particular social
group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a
(continued...)
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has defined the
grouping as one “comprised of individuals who possess some
fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor – or in the eyes of
the outside world in general.” Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664
(2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Under that definition, “the
attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and
discrete.” Id.
Beginning in 2006, the BIA added additional
considerations to its definition of “particular social group” as
first articulated in Acosta. In In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951
(BIA 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Attorney General,
446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), the BIA held that the “social
visibility” of the members of a claimed social group is an
important consideration in identifying the existence of a
‘particular social group.’” Id. It also held that “particularity”
was an element in the particular social group analysis. Id. at
957. Accordingly, the group of “former noncriminal drug
informants working against the Cali drug cartel” was not a
“particular social group” because the group [did] not have
“social visibility.” Id. There, the BIA began its analysis with
the definition used in Acosta. Id. at 955. It then noted that

11

(...continued)
former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members
that members either cannot or should not be required to
change it.”), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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some of its prior decisions involving particular social groups
“have considered the recognizability, i.e., the social visibility,
of the group in question. Social groups based on innate
characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally
easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social
groups. ” Id. at 959 (citing Matter of H-). However, and rather
inexplicably, the Board also noted that some of its other
decisions “involved characteristics that were highly visible and
recognizable by others in the country in question.” Id. at 960
(citing, inter alia, Matter of Kasinga; Matter of TobosoAlfonso; and Matter of Fuentes). Finally, the Board explained
that “the two illustrations of past experiences that might suffice
for social group membership in Matter of Acosta, i.e., “former
military leadership or land ownership,” are easily recognizable
traits. Id.
The BIA noted that because visibility is an important
element in identifying the existence of a particular social group,
confidential informants do not have that requisite social
visibility because the “very nature” of being a confidential
informant “is such that it is generally out of the public view. In
the normal course of events, an informant against the Cali cartel
intends to remain unknown and undiscovered.” Id. Thus, the
BIA found the proposed group did not qualify for relief as a
“particular social group” under the INA.
The BIA also considered whether the group was defined
with the requisite particularity, and concluded that the proposed
group of “noncriminal informants” was “too loosely defined to
meet the requirement of particularity.” Id. at 957.
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In In re A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (BIA 2007),
aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir.
2007), the BIA returned to the concepts of social visibility and
particularity. There, the BIA opined that the “[f]actors to be
considered in determining whether a particular social group
exists include whether the group’s shared characteristic gives
the members the requisite social visibility to make them readily
identifiable in society and whether the group can be defined
with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership.” Id. at
69. The proposed group was affluent Guatemalans who, it was
alleged, are at a greater risk of crime in general or who are
subject to extortion or robbery in particular. The BIA found
that “there is little in the background evidence of record to
indicate that wealthy Guatemalans would be recognized as a
group that is at a greater risk of crime in general or extortion or
robbery in particular.” Id. at 74. The BIA noted that “violence
and crime in Guatemala appear to be pervasive at all socioeconomic levels.” Id. at 75. Because of the pervasive nature of
crime “even people with relatively modest resources or income
may possess sufficient land, crops, or other forms of wealth to
make them potential targets” of criminals. Id. Accordingly, the
BIA held that the proposed group of affluent Guatemalans “fails
the ‘social visibility’ test.” Id.
The BIA also found that the group did not satisfy the
requirement of “particularity:”
The terms “wealthy” and “affluent”
standing alone are too amorphous
to provide an adequate benchmark
for determining group membership.
Depending on one’s perspective,
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the wealthy may be limited to the
very top echelon; [or] might
include small business owners and
others living a relatively
comfortable existence in a
generally impoverished country.
Because the concept of wealth is so
indeterminate, the proposed group
could vary from as little as 1
percent to as much as 20 percent of
the population, or more. . . . The
characteristic of wealth or
affluence is simply too subjective,
inchoate, and variable to provide
the sole basis for membership in a
particular social group.
Id. at 76.
As noted, the BIA has applied its “social visibility” and
“particularity” requirements to proposed groups who resisted
gang recruitment efforts. In Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec.
579 (BIA 2008)12 , one of the proposed groups was: “Salvadoran

12

On August 26, 2008, a petition for review was
docked with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sub
nom. Gonzales-Mira v. Mukasey, No. 08-2925 (8th Cir.
2008). On July 28, 2009, the BIA reopened the case and
remanded, but it did not vacate the precedential decision. On
(continued...)
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youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13
and who have rejected membership based on their own
personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values
and activities.” Id. at 579. There, the BIA explained that it was
guided by its recent holdings in Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U and
Matter of C-A and held that: “membership in a purported social
group requires that the group have particular and well-defined
boundaries, and that it possess a recognized level of social
visibility.” Id. at 582. The BIA believed that “[t]hese concepts
of ‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility’ give greater specificity
to the definition of a social group, which was first determined
in Matter of Acosta.” Id.
With regard to “particularity,” the BIA wrote:
The essence of the particularity
requirement . . . is whether the
proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be
recognized, in the society in
question, as a discrete class of

12

(...continued)
September 9, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, and did not grant the petitioner’s request that
the court vacate the precedential opinion in light of the BIA’s
order reopening. Gonzales-Mira v. Holder, Nos. 08-2925, 092678 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009).
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persons. While the size of the
proposed group may be an
important factor in determining
whether the group can be so
recognized, the key question is
whether the proposed description is
sufficiently particular, or is too
amorphous . . . to create a
benchmark for determining group
membership.
Id. at 584 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
BIA held that the proposed group lacked particularity. The BIA
explained that the group “make[s] up a potentially large and
diffuse segment of society, and the motivation of gang members
in recruiting and targeting young males could arise from
motivations quite apart from any perception that the males in
question were members of a class.” Id.
The BIA held that the proposed group lacked “social
visibility” as well. It wrote:
The question whether a proposed
group has a shared characteristic
with the requisite “social visibility”
must be considered in the context
of the country of concern and the
persecution feared.
The
[applicants] in this case are victims
of harassment, beatings, and threats
from a criminal gang in El
Salvador. There is little in the
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background evidence of record to
indicate that Salvadoran youth who
are recruited by gangs but refuse to
join . . . would be perceived as a
group by society, or that these
individuals suffer from a higher
incidence of crime than the rest of
the population.
The [applicants] assert that the
have a specific reason (i.e., their
refusal to join the gang) to fear the
MS-13 would subject them to more
violence than the general
population. We do not doubt . . .
that gangs such as MS-13 retaliate
against those who refuse to join
their ranks. However, such gangs
have directed harm against anyone
and everyone perceived to have
interfered with, or who might
present a threat to, their criminal
enterprises and territorial power.
The [applicants] are therefore not
in a substantially different situation
from anyone who has crossed the
gang, or who is perceived to be a
threat to the gang’s interests.
Id. at 586-87.
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The BIA denied relief because the proposed group
lacked “particularity” and “social visibility,” and was therefore,
not a “particular social group.”13
In Matter of E-A-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), the
BIA held, inter alia, that Honduran males who resisted gang
recruitment did not constitute a “particular social group” within
the meaning of the INA. It explained:
[T]he particular social group
identified . . . as “persons resistant
to gang membership” lacks the
social visibility that would allow
others to identify its members as
part of such a group. Persons who
resist joining gangs have not been
shown to be part of a socially
visible group within Honduran
society, and the [applicant] does
not allege that he possesses any
characteristics that would cause
others in Honduran society to
recognize him as one who has
refused gang recruitment.
Of
course, individuals who resist gang

13

In Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744-747
(9th Cir. 2008), the court of appeals relied on Matter of S-E-G
and its own precedent in concluding that the proposed group
of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” lacks
the “social visibility” and “particularity” to constitute a
“particular social group” within the meaning of the INA.
43

recruitment may face the risk of
harm from the refused gang. But
such a risk would arise from the
individualized reaction of the gang
to the specific behavior of the
prospective recruit. There is no
showing that membership in a
larger body of persons resistant to
gangs is of concern to anyone in
Honduras, including the gangs
themselves, or that individuals who
are part of that body of persons are
seen as a segment of the population
in any meaningful respect.
Id. at 594-95.
We include this rather lengthy summary of the legal
landscape surrounding claims of “a particular social group” in
order to address Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s argument that the BIA
erred by applying a new standard to adjudicate his claim. We
understand Valdiviezo-Galdamez to be arguing that the BIA
erred because it based its rejection of his claim on Matter of SE-G and Matter of E-A-G, which were decided on July 30,
2008, which he submits was past the time in which he could
have filed briefs addressing those decisions.14 However, the

14

On June 15, 2005, the IJ denied ValdiviezoGaldamez’s applications for relief. On February 27, 2006, the
(continued...)
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concepts of “social visibility” and “particularity” discussed in
Matter of S-E-G and Matter of E-A-G did not originate in those
cases. Rather, as we have explained, both concepts arise from
In re C-A and In re A-M-E & J-G-U, which were decided prior
to our remand of Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s case on September 7,
2007.15 Thus, the BIA did not apply a new standard to
determine membership in a “particular social group.” Rather,
the BIA simply applied two other cases involving gang
recruitment-based social group claims in which the requirements
of “social visibility” and “particularity” were discussed and
applied.

B. The BIA erred by applying a new standard to
determine
membership in a “particular social group” without
providing Valdiviezo-Galdamez with notice or an

14

(...continued)
BIA summarily affirmed the IJ. On September 7, 2007, we
remanded to the BIA for a determination of whether
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s proposed social group was a
“particular social group” within the meaning of the INA.
On April 9, 2008, the BIA issued a briefing schedule,
informing the parties that briefs were due by April 30, 2008.
It later extended the filing deadline to May 31, 2008. Two
months later, on July 30, 2008, the BIA decided Matter of SE-G and Matter of E-A-G.
15

In re C-A was decided on June 15, 2006 and In re AM-E & J-G-U was decided on January 31, 2007.
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opportunity to be heard.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez submits that the BIA denied him
due process by applying Matter of S-E-G and Matter of E-A-G
to him without affording him notice of its intent to apply those
cases to decide his appeal or giving him an opportunity to file
a responsive brief. He contends that the BIA failed to send a
copy of its notice of briefing to his attorneys of record, Martin
P. Duffey and Ayodele Gansallo. See n.3, supra. He also
contends that the government certified that it served the notice
on Nicole Simon, who represented him in his first appeal to the
BIA. However, he claims that there is no reason to believe that
she received that notice because she had changed jobs and had
changed her address. This claim is meritless.
As noted, see n.3, supra, no one entered an appearance
with the BIA on Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s behalf on remand.
Thus, he had no attorney of record. Valdiviezo-Galdamez
appeared pro se and did not file a brief. Moreover, even if
Simon had changed her address, it was clearly her responsibility
to advise the BIA of that change. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).
Valdiviezo-Galdamez also contends that he was
deprived of due process because the BIA did not notify him that
it intended to apply Matter of S-E-G and Matter of E-A-G to his
case. This contention is also without merit. First, we know of
no authority that would require the BIA to have notified
Valdiviezo-Galdamez of the law it intended to apply to his case,
and he offers none that would support his claim. See Theagene
v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that
the asylum applicant “cited no authority for the proposition that
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an alien’s right to due process is . . . violated when the Board
applies controlling legal authority to a pending case without
informing the alien or providing an opportunity to respond”);
see also id. at 113 (“Though a tribunal often requests
supplemental briefs in such cases, applying new law to a
pending case without notice does not, under any authority cited
to us, offend due process.”). Second, the BIA is required to
apply new law to its review. Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1156
(9th Cir. 1999).
C. The BIA’s requirements of “social visibility” and
“particularity”
are contrary to the intent of the statute.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez submits that the requiring him to
prove “social visibility” and “particularity” was contrary to the
provisions of the INA. We interpret the argument as referring
to the term “particular social group” contained in the 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). As we have explained, Congress there
defined the term “refugee” as used in the INA. However, his
argument that the two requirements are contrary to the intent of
the statute is problematic for reasons we explained in Fatin.
There, we observed that the statutory language “standing alone
is not very instructive” as to the meaning of the term “particular
social group,” and that “neither the legislative history of the
relevant United States statutes nor the negotiating history of the
pertinent international agreements sheds much light of the
meaning of the phrase ‘particular social group.’” 12 F.3d at
1239. That is why we looked to the BIA’s interpretation of the
phrase in Matter of Acosta, applied the Chevron analysis to that
interpretation, found the BIA’s interpretation permissible, and
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held that the BIA’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron
deference.
D. The BIA’s requirements of “social visibility” and
“particularity”
are not entitled to Chevron deference.
As we have noted, see n.9, supra, in INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-50 (1987), the Supreme Court held
that the BIA’s interpretation of the Refugee Act is entitled to
Chevron deference. Therefore, in considering the BIA’s
interpretation of the Act, we ask “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842. If it has not, we may not “simply impose [our] own
construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. “Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez contends that the BIA’s
requirement that a “particular social group” possess the elements
of “social visibility” and “particularity” is not entitled to
Chevron deference.
(i). “Social Visibility”
In In re C-A, 23 I. & N. at 959-60, the BIA referred to
“social visibility” alternatively as “recognizability.”
In
attempting to refine the concept of “social visibility,” the Board
explained that in its other decisions recognizing “particular
social groups,” the groups “involved characteristics that were
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highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in
question.” In In re A-M-U & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. at 74, the BIA
held that “social visibility” requires that the “shared
characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by
others in the community” and that the “members of the group
are perceived as a group by society.”
Valdiviezo-Galdamez contends that this requirement of
“social visibility” is inconsistent with a number of the BIA’s
prior decisions and is therefore not entitled to deference under
Chevron. We agree.16
In the wake of Acosta, the BIA recognized a number of
groups as “particular social groups” where there was no
indication that the group’s members possessed “characteristics
that were highly visible and recognizable by others in the
country in question” or possessed characteristics that were
otherwise “socially visible” or recognizable. Indeed, we are

16

We do note, however, that the Court of Appeals for

the First, Second, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
all approved the BIA’s “social visibility” requirement for a
“particular social group” and have accorded it Chevron
deference. See, e.g., Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 5960 (1st Cir. 2009); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 74
(2nd Cir. 2007); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629
(8th Cir. 2008); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746
(9th Cir. 2008); Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th
Cir. 2006).
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hard-pressed to understand how the “social visibility”
requirement was satisfied in prior cases using the Acosta
standard. By way of examples noted above, the BIA has found
each of the following groups to constitute a “particular social
group” for purposes of refugee status: women who are opposed
to female genital mutilation (Matter of Kasinga), homosexuals
required to register in Cuba, (Matter of Toboso-Alfonso), and
former members of the El Salvador national police (Matter of
Fuentes). Yet, neither anything in the Board’s opinions in those
cases nor a general understanding of any of those groups,
suggests that the members of the groups are “socially visible.”
The members of each of these groups have characteristics which
are completely internal to the individual and cannot be observed
or known by other members of the society in question (or even
other members of the group) unless and until the individual
member chooses to make that characteristic known.
If a member of any of these groups applied for asylum
today, the BIA’s “social visibility” requirement would pose an
unsurmountable obstacle to refugee status, even though the BIA
has already held that membership in any of these groups
qualifies for refugee status if an alien can establish that s/he was
persecuted “on account of” that group membership.
Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation of
“particular social group” Chevron deference in Fatin, this did
not give the agency license to thereafter adjudicate claims of
social group status inconsistently, or irrationally. “Agencies are
not free, under Chevron, to generate erratic, irreconcilable
interpretations of their governing statutes . . . Consistency over
time and across subjects is a relevant factor [under Chevron]
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when deciding whether the agency’s current interpretation is
‘reasonable.’” Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920
(9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing CardozoFonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30) (emphasis in original). Since the
“social visibility” requirement is inconsistent with past BIA
decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the
requirements for establishing refugee status where that status
turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group.
We are not the only court of appeals to express concerns
about the BIA’s requirement of “social visibility.” In Gatimi v.
Holder, 578 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2009), Gatimi was a Kenyan and

a member of the Kikuyu tribe. That tribe dominated Kenyan
politics at the relevant times. In 1995, Gatimi joined a Kikuyu
group called the “Mungiki.”
Tribal practices included
compelling women to undergo female genital mutilation.
Gatimi defected from the Mungiki in 1999. As a result, he was
subsequently kidnaped and tortured by members of the Mungiki
group. That group also repeatedly sought out Gatimi’s wife in
order to have her undergo female genital mutilation.
Ultimately, the family fled to United States and sought asylum.
An IJ denied Gatimi’s application for asylum, holding,
inter alia, that defectors from the Mungiki did not constitute a
“particular social group.” The BIA affirmed on that basis. On
Gatimi’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit noted that in one of its prior decisions,
Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2006), it had
held that:
[F]ormer subordinates of the
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attorney general of Colombia who
had information about the
insurgents plaguing that nation
were a “particular social group.”
They had been targeted for
assassination by the insurgents, and
many had been assassinated. While
an employee could resign from the
attorney general’s office, he could
not resign from a group defined as
former employees of that office;
once a former employee, always a
former employee (unless one is
reemployed by one’s former
employer).
Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615. In adjudicating Gatimi’s petition for
review, the court reasoned: “[w]e cannot see how this case can
be distinguished from Sepulveda, which the [BIA] did not cite.”
Id. Instead, the court of appeals noted that the BIA had cited
cases “which hold that a group must have ‘social visibility’ to
be a member of a ‘particular social group[.]’” Applying the
“social visibility” formula, the BIA had found that:
there was no evidence that Gatimi possesses any
characteristics that would cause others in Kenyan
society to recognize him as a former member of
Mungiki. . . . There is no showing that
membership in a larger body of persons resistant
to Mungiki is of concern to anyone in Kenya or
that such individuals are seen as a segment of the
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population in any meaningful respect.
Id.
The court of appeals concluded that “[t]his formula [i.e.,
“social visibility’] cannot be squared with Sepulveda.” Id.
Significantly for our purposes, the court of appeals went on to
say:
[social visibility] makes no sense; nor has the
Board attempted, in this or any other case, to
explain the reasoning behind the criterion of
social visibility. Women who have not yet
undergone female genital mutilation in tribes that
practice it do not look any different from anyone
else. A homosexual in a homophobic society will
pass as heterosexual. If you are a member of a
group that has been targeted for assassination or
torture or some other mode of persecution, you
will take pains to avoid being socially visible; and
to the extent that the members of the target group
are successful in remaining invisible, they will
not be “seen” by other people in the society “as a
segment of the population.” Those former
employees of the Colombian attorney general
tried hard, one can be sure, to become invisible
and, so far as appears, were unknown to
Colombian society as a whole.
Id. We agree.
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The court then explained the distinction between
Gatimi’s situation and that which confronted the Supreme Court
in Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006):
We are mindful of the Supreme
Court’s admonition to the courts of
appeals in Gonzales v. Thomas . .
. , that the Board’s definition of
“particular social group” is entitled
to deference. The issue in that case
was whether a family could be a
particular social group, a difficult
issue on which the Board had not
opined; and the Court held that the
Board should have an opportunity
to do so. But regarding “social
visibility” as a criterion for
determining “particular social
group,” the Board has been
inconsistent rather than silent. It
has found groups to be “particular
social groups” without reference to
social visibility,
Id. (citing In re Kasinga, In re Toboso-Alfonso, In re Fuentes
and In re Acosta).
“When an administrative agency’s decisions are
inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines
and defer to that one, unless only one is within the scope of the
agency’s discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to
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make policy as Congress’s delegate.” Id. at 616. The Gatimi
court noted that other courts of appeals had deferred to the
Board on this issue, but the mere fact that some appellate courts
disagreed with its analysis was not persuasive. As the court
explained: “We just don’t see what work “social visibility”
does; the candidate groups flunked the basic “social group” test
. . . declared in . . . Acosta (where the test originated).” 578 F.3d
at 616.
The court of appeals reiterated its criticism of the
Board’s handling of “particular social group” claims in Benitez
Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009). There, the BIA
had denied an alien’s application for relief from removal based
on his claim that he was entitled to refugee status as a “tatooed,
former Salvadoran gang member.” The petitioner had joined
the gang when he was fourteen, but subsequently came to the
United States and became a “born-again Christian.” He argued
that if returned to El Salvador, he would be recognized as a
gang member because of his tattoos and forced to engage in
practices which violated his religious scruples. The BIA
concluded that the group that he claimed to be a member of did
not constitute a “particular social group” under the INA. Id. at
429. On review before the court of appeals, the government
relied on past BIA decisions and argued “that to be a ‘particular
social group’ a group must have ‘social visibility.’” Id. at 430.
In rejecting that position, the court explained:
By this the government means –
and its lawyer was emphatic at
argument . . . that you can be a
member of a particular social group
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only if a complete stranger could
identify you as a member if he
encountered you in the street,
because of your appearance, gait,
speech pattern, behavior or other
discernable characteristic.
This position has some judicial
support, . . ., but we have rejected it
in Gatimi and other cases cited in
Gatimi, as a misunderstanding of
the use of “external” criteria to
identify a social group . . . .
“Visibility” in the literal sense in
which the Board sometimes used
the term might be relevant to
whether there is persecution, but it
is irrelevant to whether if there is
persecution it will be on the ground
of group membership. Often it is
unclear whether the Board is using
the term “social visibility” in the
literal sense, or in the “external
criterion” sense, or even-whether it
understands the difference.
Id (citations omitted). .
Here, the government contends that “social visibility”
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does not mean on-sight visibility.17 Rather, we are told that
“social visibility” is a means to discern the necessary element of
group perceptibility, i.e., the existence of a unifying
characteristic that makes the members understood by others in
society to constitute a social group or recognized as a discrete
group in society. We have a hard time understanding why the
government’s definition does not mean “on-sight visibility,” and
we join the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
wondering “ even-whether [the BIA] understands the

difference.”
As the courts have noted, members of some persecuted
groups that have been recognized as a “particular social group”
would certainly take pains to avoid being identified in a society
where they would face persecution if government agents knew
they belonged to the group.18 Yet, by attempting to avoid
persecution by blending in to the society at large, the Boards’
rational would cause them to forfeit eligibility for asylum based
on the persecution they would experience if recognized as a
member of the particular social group in their society.
Thus, the government’s attempt to add gloss to the BIA’s
reliance on “social visibility” is at odds with the phrase itself as

17

The government makes this contention despite its
apparent concession to the contrary in Benitez Ramos, 598
F.3d at 430, cited supra.
18

See Matter of Kasinga, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,
and Matter of Fuentes, discussed, supra.
57

well as the BIA’s definition in In C-A and In re A-M-U & J-GU. Indeed, rather than adding gloss to the BIA’s interpretation,
the government seems to be attempting to spackle over the
cracks in the way the BIA has approached social group cases.
The government’s position appears to be little more than an
attempt to avoid the tension arising from the BIA’s various
interpretations of that phrase, and the fact that the BIA’s present
interpretation would have excluded the asylum claims that were
granted in In re Kasinga, In re Toboso-Alfonso, and In re
Fuentes. As we have noted, in each of those cases, the aliens’
social group claim was successful, even though the group in
question was not “socially visible.” Thus, we reject the
government’s attempt to graft that requirement onto ValdiviezoGaldamez’s claim here. For similar reasons, the government’s
attempt to graft the requirement of “particularity” onto social
group claims fares no better.
(ii). “Particularity”
Valdiviezo-Galdamez also argues that the BIA’s
requirement of “particularity” should not be afforded Chevron
deference. In Matter of S-E-G, the BIA explained:

The essence of the particularity
requirement . . . is whether the
proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be
recognized, in the society in
question, as a discrete class of
persons. While the size of the
proposed group may be an
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important factor in determining
whether the group can be so
recognized, the key question is
whether the proposed description is
sufficiently particular, or is too
amorphous . . . to create a
benchmark for determining group
membership.
24 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Valdiviezo-Galdamez, presumably focusing on the
second sentence in the definition of “particularity,” contends
that there is nothing in the statutory language that suggests that
Congress intended to place any numerical limitation on the
protected ground of a “particular social group.” He notes that,
in deferring to the BIA under Acosta, courts of appeals have
said that “particular social group” “ encompass[es] any group,
however populous, persecuted because of shared characteristics
that are either immutable or fundamental.” Gao v. Gonzales,
440 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007). Accordingly,
Valdiviezo-Galdamez submits that the BIA’s attempt to impose
a numerical limitation is not entitled to deference.
The government responds by arguing that the
“particularity” requirement is not an attempt to impose a
numerical limitation on the size of a “particular social group.”

According to the government, “particularity” merely functions
to assess whether a proposed group has definable boundaries so
that it can constitute a distinct group, or a discrete class of
persons. In the government’s view, “particularity” serves a
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different function from “social visibility” in determining
whether the asylum applicant has described a cognizable social
group. Thus, according to the government, “social visibility”
assesses whether the applicant has identified a group with a
unifying characteristic that is perceived as discrete or set apart
by the society, while “particularity” examines whether the
proposed unifying characteristic for the proposed group is
definable, as opposed to being too diffuse or subjective. The
government argues that these two concepts are related, but
distinct and that they have complimentary functions.
We do not believe that the government is using
particularity to impose a numerical or size limitation on the
meaning of “particular social group.” However, we are hardpressed to discern any difference between the requirement of
“particularity” and the discredited requirement of “social
visibility.” Indeed, they appear to be different articulations of
the same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish
the two oscillates between confusion and obfuscation, while at
times both confusing and obfuscating. Indeed, “Particularity”
appears to be little more than a reworked definition of “social
visibility” and the former suffers from the same infirmity as the
latter. The government’s use of “particularity” is inconsistent
with the prior BIA decisions discussed in the “social visibility”
portion of this opinion. We therefore hold that adopting a
“particularity” requirement is unreasonable because it is
inconsistent with many of the BIA’s prior decisions.
In sum, because the BIA’s requirements that a “particular
social group” possess the elements of “social visibility” and
“particularity” are inconsistent with prior BIA decisions, those
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requirements are not entitled to Chevron deference. By holding
that the BIA’s addition of the requirements of “social visibility”
and “particularity” to the definition of “particular social group”
it announced in Acosta is not entitled to Chevron deference, we
do not suggest that the BIA cannot add new requirements to, or
even change, its definition of “particular social group.” Clearly,
“an agency can change or adopt its policies.” Johnson v.
Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002). However, an
agency “acts arbitrarily if it departs from its established
precedents without announcing a principled reason for its
decision.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
If an agency “departs from an announced rule without
explanation or an avowed alteration, such action could be
viewed as arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discrection.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (bracket in
original).19 Here, as we have explained, the BIA’s addition of
the requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” to its
definition of “particular social group” is inconsistent with its
prior decisions, and the BIA has not announced a “principled
reason” for its adoption of those inconsistent requirements.
Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review and remand
to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2. The BIA erred in holding that Valdiviezo-Galdamez

was not

19

Of course, the BIA must not only announce a
“principled reason” for any changes it makes to its definition
of “particular social group,” any announced changes must be
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
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eligible for asylum based upon his political opinion.
When we previously remanded to the BIA, ValdiviezoGaldamez also contended that he was entitled to asylum based
on his political opinion. He asserted that “he was persecuted
‘on account of his inherently political anti-gang opinion’ as
evident by his refusal to join the Mara Salvatrucha gang.” App.
11. The BIA rejected this claim, finding that it was foreclosed
by INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 479 (1992). There, the
Supreme Court held that a guerrilla organization’s attempts to
conscript a Guatemalan native into its military forces did not
necessarily constitute persecution on account of political
opinion.
The foundation of Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s political
opinion argument is his contention that his refusal to join a gang
“was, by definition, the expression of a political opinion.”
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s Br. at 41. He rests that argument upon
an unpublished decision in which an IJ held that a nineteen year
old Honduran male’s refusal to join Mara Salvatrucha was an
expression of political opinion. See Matter of D-V (San
Antonio, Texas Immigration Court, Sept. 2004). However,
Valdiviezo-Galdamez offers no higher authority to support his
contention that his refusal to join the Mara Salvatrucha was, by
definition, the expression of a political opinion.
Moreover, even if we assume that refusal to join a gang
is an expression of political opinion, there is no evidence that
his refusal to join was taken by the gang as an expression of that
political opinion. There is no evidence that he ever expressed to
the gang that he was opposed to membership in the gang
62

because of his claimed political opinion. To the extent that his
refusal to join the gang was based on his political opinion, his
refusal was based on an internally held political opinion which
cannot support a claim that he was persecuted on account of that
political opinion. Holding a political opinion, without more, is
not sufficient to show persecution on account of that political
opinion. Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010).
There must be evidence that the gang knew of his political
opinion and targeted him because of it. Id. However, there is
no such evidence here.
3. The BIA erred in denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s
application for relief under the CAT.
As noted, in denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s application
for relief under the CAT, the BIA first found that ValdiviezoGaldamez “failed to establish that it is more likely than not that
he will be subject[ed] to torture at the hands of the Mara
Salvatrucha gang.” App. 12. The BIA found that ValdiviezoGaldamez’s “numerous interactions” with the gang constituted
“harassment.” Id. It further found that the interactions “clearly
did not involve the degree of ‘severe pain and suffering’
contemplated as constituting torture.” Id. at 12-13. In sum, the
BIA found that Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s arguments regarding the
likelihood of torture “are speculative and not based on evidence
in the record.” Id. at 13.
The BIA also concluded that even if it is assumed
arguendo that it was more likely than not that he would be
tortured at the hands of the gang, Valdiviezo-Galdamez “failed
to establish that such torture would be “inflicted by or at the
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instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id.
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)).
In this portion of his petition for review, ValdiviezoGaldamez contends that the BIA’s denial of his application for
relief under the CAT was error. We disagree.
Assuming arguendo that the treatment ValdiviezoGaldamez suffered at the hands of the Mara Salvatrucha
constituted torture, Valdiviezo-Galdamez must also show that
the torture was inflicted with the “acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(2). “Acquiescence to torture requires only that
government officials remain willfully blind to torturous conduct
and breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.” SilvaRengifo, 473 F.3d at 70.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez points to testimony that he sought
police protection on five different occasions, but the police were
either not able to help, or not willing to help by prosecuting the
gang members who were responsible. He testified that the
police would always tell him that they were investigating but
that at no point did he ever “see anything happen.” Instead,
Valdiviezo-Galdamez testified that he continued to suffer at the
hands of the gang.
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s view, the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from these facts is that the police
were willfully blind to the gang’s torturous conduct and
breached their legal duty to prevent it. He rests his argument in
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part upon In re O-Z & I-Z, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998).
There, the asylum applicant had reported at least three incidents
of beatings and anti-Semitic threats, but the police took no
action other than writing a report. The BIA found that sufficient
to show that the government “was unable or unwillling to
control the [alien’s] attackers.” 20
However, as the government notes, ValdiviezoGaldamez’s proposed inference was not the only reasonable
inference that could be drawn here, and the BIA drew a
different, but equally reasonable inference from his testimony.
The Board explained:
We acknowledge that [ValdiviezoGaldamez] testified that he made
approximately five police reports
concerning his num erous
interactions with the gang, and that
the police indicated that they were
investigating the matter, but that he
never saw any progress. However,
the fact that [Valdiviezo-Galdamez]
was unaware of progress in the
investigation does not mean that the

20

As noted earlier, a claim that the government was
“unwilling or unable to control the the [alien’s] attackers” is
one which must be proven by an asylum applicant, not a
claimant for relief under the CAT. We assume that
Valdiviezo-Galdamez is citing to In re 0-Z & I-Z by way of an
analogy.
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police were not taking measures to
deal with the problem in ways that
were not obvious to [ValdiviezoGaldamez]. Although [ValdiviezoGaldamez’s] testimony and the
background materials in the record
clearly reflect that criminal gangs
are a problem in Honduras, the
record also indicates that the
government seeks to combat the
problem and protect its citizens.
See, e.g., U.S. Department of State,
Honduras: Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices – 2004
( F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 5 ) (E x h . 4 )
(indicating the existence of joint
police and military patrols to
combat crimes and gangs, and the
existence of anti-gang legislation).
App. 13. Based upon that ambiguity in the testimony, and
applicable Counttry Reports, the BIA found that the government
of Honduras was not willfully blind to or did not acquiesce to
the gang’s activities.
We also reject Valdiviez-Galdamez’s contention that the
BIA could not rely on background materials in arriving at its
conclusion that the government was not willfully blind or did
not acquiese to the gang’s activities. He bases that contention
on a statement we made in a footnote in Valdiviezo-Galdamez
I. We wrote, inter alia:
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We cannot accept the government’s
contention that the background
materials submitted at the hearing
support the IJ’s finding and denial
of the asylum claim. First, the IJ
did not address the relevant
question: whether the government
was “unwilling or unable” to
control the gang members. Second,
the materials referenced by the
government describe the general
negative attitude in Honduras
towards “street children” and
youths with tattoos, and do not
describe with any detail efforts by
the government to crack down on
gangs. The most relevant statement
in these materials is that: “During
the year, nearly half of all military
personnel were assigned for most
of the time to joint patrols with
police to prevent and combat high
levels of criminal and gang
violence.” This does not refute
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s credible
testimony, which the IJ failed to
address, that the police took no
action in response to his complaints
that he was repeatedly attacked by
gang members. If anything, the
evidence that gang violence is a
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serious problem in Honduras
provides additional support for
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s claims.
502 F.3d at 289 n.2.
The “most relevant statement” we referred to in footnote
2 is taken from the findings of the United States Department of
State in Honduras: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, 2004 (Feb. 28, 2005). However, we do not believe
that this statement from Valdiviezo-Galdamez I precluded the
BIA from relying on country background materials on remand.
At the outset, we note that in Valdiviezo-Galdamez I we were
addressing whether the government was “unwilling or unable”
to control the gang members. As we have noted, that is an
appropriate inquiry in the context of an asylum claim. The
“unwilling or unable to” standard is not applicable to a claim for
relief under the CAT. Thus, the statement is dicta.
Moreover, even if the statement is interpreted as
precluding the BIA from relying on the Country Report itself,
the Country Report cited to other sources which dealt with the
Honduran government’s response to gang violence and activity.
For example, the Report described a 2002 law “outlawing gang
membership [and] prescrib[ing] prison terms from 3 to 12 years,
depending upon the individual’s level of involvement and
seniority.”
Moreover, the BIA did not rely solely on the Country
Report. It also considered media articles on the government’s
enforcement of its anti-gang law. App. 13. A September 2003
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article noted that “Honduran police have been making a regular
practice in recent weeks of descending upon gang-ridden
neighborhoods at dawn,” and “hauling [young suspects] off to
jail.” App. 325. That same article noted that the Honduran
President asserted that the police focused “only on gang leaders,
with a goal of 2,000 arrests in the coming months.” App. 326.
It further noted that the President asserted that the “immediate
result [was] a 70 percent drop in homicides and an increase in
gang members looking to check into rehabilitation programs.”
App. 326
A February 2005 article cited a Presidential statement
that Honduras was “winning its fight against violence, mainly by
implementing” the anti-gang law. App. 332. In that same
article, the President stated that, over the last three years,
“Honduras has seen a 90 percent decrease in kidnappings and a
60 percent decrease in ‘maras’ activities, as 800 gang members
out of a total of almost 2,000 who were originally arrested were
now in jail.” App. 332.
These media reports clearly support the BIA’s finding
that the “government seeks to combat the [gang] problem and
protect its citizens.”
Thus, the BIA’s conclusion that
Valdiviezo-Galdamez failed to show that it was “more likely
than not” that he would be tortured as a result of the alleged
“willful[] blind[ness]” by the Honduran government was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it did not err in
denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s application for relief under the
CAT.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, we will grant the petition for
review and remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent with
this opinion, but will deny the petition for review on the claim
for relief under the CAT.
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Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Atty Gen USA
No. 08-4564
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with my colleagues that the BIA‘s decision in
this case raises concerns warranting remand, but I write
separately to express my understanding of the scope of the
BIA‘s discretion upon remand. In my view, the BIA is free to
adopt the additional requirements of ―particularity‖ and
―social visibility,‖ exactly as the Board has defined and
rationalized them over the last five years. The only problem
that I find with the BIA‘s evolving approach to ―particular
social group‖ cases is that the Board has failed to
acknowledge a change in course and forthrightly address how
that change affects the continued validity of conflicting
precedent. Accordingly, remand is necessary so the Board
can either choose between its reasonable new requirements
and its older but equally reasonable precedents, or reconcile
the two interpretations in a coherent way.
In addition, I am troubled by the BIA‘s factfinding in
this case. Should the BIA choose to adopt new requirements
for ―particular social group,‖ I believe that it must also
remand to the IJ for further factual development.
I
A
It is settled law that Chevron deference applies to BIA
interpretations of ―‗ambiguous statutory terms‘‖ in the INA.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163–64 (2009) (quoting
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
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U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
We have recognized that
―particular social group,‖ as used in the INA‘s definition of
―refugee,‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), is so ambiguous that
―[b]oth courts and commentators have struggled to define
[it],‖ and ―[r]ead in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is
almost completely open-ended.‖ Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1238 (3d Cir. 1993). There should be no question, then, that
Chevron deference applies, as long as ―the agency‘s [reading
of the statute] is based on a permissible construction.‖
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
The Supreme Court recognized in Chevron that ―[a]n
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved into
stone.‖ 467 U.S. at 863. It is therefore possible for the BIA‘s
current interpretation of the statute to conflict with prior
decisions without constituting an ―impermissible‖ or
―unreasonable‖ reading of the INA. The BIA must, however,
provide ―explanation or an ‗avowed alteration,‘‖ or its change
―could be viewed as ‗arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion.‘‖ Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir.
2002) (quoting INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996)); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We
have held that an agency may change course and reinterpret
statutes ―as long as it can justify its change with a ‗reasoned
analysis.‘‖ Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 179 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). In FCC v. Fox,
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), the Supreme
Court described the ―reasoned analysis‖ requirement this
way:
To be sure, the requirement that an agency
provide reasoned explanation for its action
would ordinarily demand that it display
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awareness that it is changing position. An
agency may not, for example, depart from a
prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard
rules that are still on the books. And of course
the agency must show that there are good
reasons for the new policy. But it need not
demonstrate to a court‘s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the
reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new
policy is permissible under the statute, that there
are good reasons for it, and that the agency
believes it to be better, which the conscious
change of course adequately indicates. This
means that the agency need not always provide
a more detailed justification than what would
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.
Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new
policy rests upon factual findings that contradict
those which underlay its prior policy; or when
its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account. It
would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such
matters. In such cases it is not that further
justification is demanded by the mere fact of
policy change; but that a reasoned explanation
is needed for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay or were engendered
by the prior policy.
129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (emphasis in original; citations
omitted).
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B
I agree with my colleagues that the BIA‘s
―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ requirements are
changes in position from the longstanding test the BIA
articulated in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A.
1985), which for over twenty years—from 1985 until 20061—
provided the most widely-adopted definition of ―particular
social group.‖ See generally Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196
(listing the six circuit courts of appeals, including the Third
Circuit, that ―deferred to the Acosta formulation,‖ and two
others that, ―while not expressly deferring[,] . . . viewed
Acosta favorably‖).
In Acosta, the BIA stated the
requirements for establishing ―persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group‖ as follows:
[W]e interpret the phrase ‗persecution on
account of membership in a particular social
group‘ to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a
group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable
characteristic.
The
shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some
circumstances it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or
1

In re C-A- was originally decided in August 2004,
but it was not published or designated as precedent until June
2006. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 n.1 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196
(11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Castillo-Arias v.
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007).
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land ownership. The particular kind of group
characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. However, whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it
must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences.
19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. ―Particularity‖ and ―social visibility,‖
as the BIA currently defines them, were not independent
elements.2
The BIA introduced ―particularity‖ as a stand-alone
requirement in In re C-A-, finding that ―noncriminal
informants‖ is a group ―too loosely defined to meet the
requirement.‖ 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006).
―Social visibility,‖ on the other hand, was first mentioned in
In re R-A- as a non-determinative factor—not a mandatory
requirement—in the ―particular social group‖ analysis. 22 I.
& N. Dec. 906, 918–19 (B.I.A. 1999) (using indefinite terms
like ―frequently,‖ ―generally,‖ ―less likely‖ to describe the
requirement and its justifications, and stating that ―[t]he
factors we look to in this case, beyond Acosta‘s
2

The word ―particular‖ in the phrase ―particular social
group‖ was given no independent or operative meaning under
the Acosta formulation. In my view, the BIA‘s recent
decisions elevating ―particularity‖ to its own requirement—
along with the traditional Acosta requirements and ―social
visibility‖—amounts to a change in the agency‘s
interpretation of ―particular social group,‖ as a term of art.
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‗immutableness‘ test, are not prerequisites‖).3
Like
―particularity,‖ ―social visibility‖ was applied again in In re
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959–961, and both became absolute
requirements in In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69,
74 (B.I.A. 2007) (referring to ―the requirements of a
particular social group‖ and ―the requirement that the shared
characteristic of the group generally be recognizable to others
in the community.‖ (emphasis in original)), aff’d sub nom.
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007). Since
In re A-M-E-, the BIA has treated these newly-minted
elements as established precedent. See In re A-T-, 24 I & N.
Dec. 296, 303 (B.I.A. 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 591, 594–95 (B.I.A. 2008).
Although the BIA frames ―particularity‖ and ―social
visibility‖ as merely ―additional considerations‖ within the
Acosta framework, In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920, or the
products of ―evolving case law,‖ Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 593, in practice, they have become stringent
requirements that can be outcome-determinative in cases like
this appeal. Where, as here, an applicant seems to meet the
Acosta requirements but is denied asylum because he fails to
show ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility,‖ it appears that the
3

Although the opinion in In re R-A- was vacated by
Attorney General Janet Reno in 2001, it remains instructive
when considering the history of, and reasoned explanation
for, the ―social visibility‖ requirement. It is also worth noting
that the BIA explicitly limited In re R-A- to its facts, stating
that it ―d[id] not intend any categorical rulings as to
analogous social group claims arising under any other
conceivable set of circumstances.‖ 22 I. & N. Dec. at 914.
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BIA has changed course from its earlier, less stringent Acosta
approach.
C
The Majority holds that: (1) because ―the requirement
of ‗social visibility‘ is inconsistent with a number of the
BIA‘s prior decisions[,] . . . [it] is therefore not entitled to
deference under Chevron‖ and ―is an unreasonable addition to
the requirements for establishing refugee status . . . [based on]
membership in a particular social group,‖ and (2) because
―‗[p]articularity‘ appears to be little more than a reworked
definition of ‗social visibility[,]‘ . . . it suffers from the same
infirmity as ‗social visibility.‘‖ Maj. Op. at 39, 41, 49. I
disagree. As discussed above, agencies are free to change
their interpretations of statutes, so the fact that there is a
conflict between ―social visibility‖ and prior BIA decisions
does not necessarily mean Chevron deference does not apply.
Nor does it mean that the BIA‘s definition of ―social
visibility‖ is ―unreasonable.‖
In keeping with Fox, I would hold that the BIA may
reinterpret ―particular social group‖ to include whatever new
requirements it sees fit—including ―particularity‖ and ―social
visibility,‖ defined exactly as they are in the line of cases
from In re R-A- through Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-AG-—as long as it ―display[s] awareness that it is changing
position‖ and ―provide[s] reasoned explanation for its action.‖
129 S. Ct. at 1811 (emphasis in original). In order to exhibit
such an awareness, I believe the Board must make a choice
between these new requirements and its prior decisions
granting ―particular social group‖ status to applicants who
would likely have been unable to show ―particularity‖ or
―social visibility.‖ The Majority is correct that ―the BIA‘s
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present interpretation [of ‗particular social group‘] would
have excluded the asylum claims that were granted in‖ cases
decided in 1996, 1990, and 1988. Maj. Op. at 46. However,
the problem arises not because of that fact, but rather because
of the BIA‘s failure to recognize and address it.
I note that the BIA has, in my opinion, adequately
explained the utility of adding ―particularity‖ and ―social
visibility‖ to the Acosta test, and unlike the Majority, I am not
convinced that the two requirements are identical. According
to In re R-A-, requiring ―social visibility‖ allows the BIA to
limit asylum to those individuals whose ―potential persecutors
in fact see persons sharing the [applicant‘s ‗social group‘]
characteristic as warranting suppression or the infliction of
harm.‖ 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918. As the BIA noted, ―[i]f a
characteristic is important in a given society, it is more likely
that distinctions will be drawn within that society between
those who share and those who do not share the
characteristic.‖ Id. at 919. In addition, ―the social group
concept would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition
if common characteristics, coupled with a meaningful level of
harm, were all that need be shown.‖ Id. ―Social visibility‖
therefore serves to limit the scope of ―particular social group‖
to more closely match the other protected characteristics of
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. Id. at 918.
Likewise, ―particularity‖ was explained in In re A-M-E- as
necessary to ―delimit . . . potential members‖ of the purported
―social group‖ and to allow the BIA to deny asylum claims
based on membership in groups, the defining characteristics
of which are ―simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable.‖
24 I. & N. Dec. at 76. If the Board were writing on a blank
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slate, I would find that it has provided a reasoned explanation
for a permissible interpretation of the law.4

4

I have two lingering questions about the provenance
of ―social visibility‖ that the BIA might address on remand.
Although the BIA can sufficiently explain and justify ―social
visibility‖ without answering these questions, any light the
BIA can shed on these issues might help courts of appeals in
the future and alleviate some of the remaining doubt about the
reasonableness of these new requirements.
The most convincing justification for the ―social
visibility‖ requirement is that ―if the alleged persecutor is not
even aware of the [asylum applicant‘s] group‘s existence, it
becomes harder to understand how the persecutor may have
been motivated by the victim‘s ‗membership‘ in the group to
inflict the harm on the victim.‖ In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
919. This helps explain why ―social visibility‖ would be a
factor in determining whether persecution is ―on account of‖
membership in a group. It remains unclear, however, why
―social visibility‖ should be used to define the group in the
first place.
Another oft-used justification for ―social visibility‖ is
that it is derived from the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees‘s (UNHCR) interpretation of the INA. In re CA-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 960 (citing UNCHR, Guidelines
on International Protection: ―Membership of a particular
social group‖ within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002),
(―UNHCR Guidelines‖)); In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74
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But the BIA‘s analysis comes undone when it states in
conclusory fashion that all of the groups recognized as
―particular social groups‖ in earlier cases would meet the
―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ requirements. See In re
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (listing ―young women of a
particular tribe who were opposed to female genital
mutilation,‖ ―persons listed by the government as having the
status of a homosexual,‖ ―former members of the national
police,‖ and ―former military leadership or land ownership‖
as ―social groups [that] involved characteristics that were
highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in
question‖). If this is true—that all of the groups that have
been recognized under the Acosta standard would be
recognized under the new approach—then the otherwise
reasonable definitions and applications of ―particularity‖ and
―social visibility‖ become, at best, muddled, and, at worst,
incoherent.

(same). The UNHCR Guidelines, however, treat ―social
visibility‖ as an alternative to Acosta as a way to establish a
―particular social group‖; it is not a requirement in addition to
Acosta. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956 (―The
UNHCR Guidelines define a ‗particular social group‘ as ‗a
group of persons who share a common characteristic other
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society.‖ (emphasis added) (quoting UNHCR
Guidelines at ¶ 11)). Why, then, has the BIA decided to turn
the Guidelines‘ disjunctive into a conjunctive, essentially
creating an ―Acosta-plus‖ test, rather than adopt the ―Acostaor‖ test endorsed by the UNHCR?
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The BIA has said that ―[t]he essence of the
‗particularity‘ requirement . . . is whether the proposed group
can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct
that the group would be recognized, in the society in question,
as a discrete class of persons.‖ Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 584. This allows the BIA to weed out groups that are
―too subjective, inchoate, and variable.‖ In re A-M-E-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. at 76. In rejecting Galdamez‘s proposed group
based on a lack of particularity, though, the BIA described it
as ―‗potentially large and diffuse.‘‖ App. at 11 (quoting
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585). This suggests that
―particularity‖ also embodies some kind of numerical or
geographical limitation. If there are no such limitations, then
it is unclear why it matters how ―large‖ or ―diffuse‖ a
proposed group is. If such limits do exist, then it is unclear
how the BIA can be sure, without hearing any argument on
the matter, that ―young women of a particular tribe who were
opposed to female genital mutilation,‖ ―persons listed by the
government as having the status of a homosexual,‖ ―former
members of the national police,‖ and ―former military
leaders[] or land owners[]‖ are any less numerous or
widespread than ―Honduran youth who have been actively
recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they
oppose the gangs.‖
―Social visibility‖ has been defined as ―the extent to
which members of a society perceive those with the
characteristic in question as members of a social group,‖
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594, and requires that
―the group . . . generally be recognizable by others in the
community,‖ Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586. It is
unclear whether this means that the group‘s shared
characteristic must be visible to the naked eye (i.e., pass the
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―eyeball test‖) or just that the applicant‘s society must
understand individuals with the shared characteristic (visible
or invisible) to be members of a group. In In re C-A-, the
BIA suggested that ―social visibility‖ is an eyeball test when
it rejected a proposed social group because its shared
characteristic is one ―that is generally out of the public view.‖
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. The BIA seemed to
reaffirm this approach in Matter of E-A-G-, when it found that
an applicant‘s proposed group lacked ―social visibility‖
because he ―d[id] not allege that he possesses any
characteristics that would cause others in [his] society to
recognize him‖ as a member. But if ―social visibility‖ is, or
somehow accounts for, an eyeball test, then it is unclear how
―young women of a particular tribe who were opposed to
female genital mutilation,‖ ―persons listed by the government
as having the status of a homosexual,‖ ―former members of
the national police,‖ or ―former military leaders[]‖ would
qualify.
Announcing a new interpretation while at the same
time reaffirming seemingly irreconcilable precedents suggests
that the BIA does not recognize, or is not being forthright
about, the nature of the change its new interpretation
effectuates. It also unfairly forces asylum applicants to shoot
at a moving target.5 It is up to the BIA to bring some stability
5

Although the BIA noted in Acosta that ―[t]he
particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under
th[e Acosta] construction remains to be determined on a caseby-case basis,‖ 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233, I assume that the BIA
was referring to case-by-case evaluation of individual
applicants‘ proposed groups and whether they meet the
established legal standard. If the BIA is permitted to engage
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to its interpretation of the law by committing either to the
Acosta line of cases or to the ―particularity‖ and ―social
visibility‖ requirements, both of which are permissible and
reasonable.
I agree with the Majority that the BIA ―can[] add new
requirements to, or even change, its definition of ‗particular
social group,‘‖ Maj. Op. at 49, but I also note that the BIA‘s
change can be the adoption of ―particularity‖ and ―social
visibility.‖ Were it not for the seemingly irreconcilable
conflict with prior decisions that the BIA has not yet
disavowed, I would see no ―reasonableness‖ problem with the
―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ requirements. Thus, the
BIA may, upon further review, decide to jettison Acosta and
its progeny or open them up to reconsideration. Conversely,
the BIA may decide that its precedent should remain intact, in
which case, ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ must be
refined or eliminated.6 It is not for us to make this choice
in case-by-case ad hoc revisions of the entire legal
framework—without acknowledgement or explanation—then
it would be free to arbitrarily pick and choose whatever
statutorily-permissible construction of ―particular social
group‖ it finds agreeable at the moment.
6

I acknowledge that there may also be some way for
the BIA to reconcile its new interpretation and its precedent,
and I do not mean to suggest that such a reconciliation
automatically renders the BIA‘s explanation defective. My
point is simply that more analysis is needed before I can
conclude that the BIA has provided a reasoned explanation of
how its new rules fit—or, it appears, do not fit—with the old
ones.
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between new requirements and precedent, nor is it our place
to impose our own readings of the statute in an attempt to
reconcile the two. Rather, the BIA should address these
issues on remand, and we should defer to whatever
conclusion it reaches—even if it is to reject precedent and
move ahead with ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ in
their current forms—provided it explains itself in a way that
exhibits expert consideration and logical, reasonable,
permissible interpretations of the INA. See N.L.R.B. v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 800 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (―Confronted with a court‘s
conclusion that two of its policy pronouncements are
inconsistent, the agency may choose for itself which path to
follow, or it may attempt to explain why no contradiction
actually exists.‖); Gatimi, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009)
(―When an administrative agency‘s decisions are inconsistent,
a court cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to
that one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency‘s
discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make
policy as Congress‘s delegate. Such picking and choosing
would condone arbitrariness and usurp the agency‘s
responsibilities.‖ (citations omitted)).
II
I also write separately to take issue with the BIA‘s
factfinding. We first remanded this case in 2007 ―so the
agency [could] address the issues that it did not reach . . .
[including] whether the group identified by Galdamez is a
‗particular social group‘ within the meaning of the Act.‖
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285,
291 (3d Cir. 2007) (Valdiviezo-Galdamez I). We did not
authorize the BIA to usurp the IJ‘s role as factfinder.
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According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), ―[e]xcept for
taking administrative notice of commonly known facts such
as current events or the contents of official documents, the
[BIA] will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding
appeals.‖ See also Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168 (―If the BIA
decides to adopt a standard that [differs from the existing
standard], it may be prudent and necessary for the
Immigration Judge to conduct additional factfinding based on
the new standard.‖ (emphasis added)); Padmore v. Holder,
609 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2010) (―[W]hen the BIA engages in
factfinding in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), it
commits an error of law, which we have jurisdiction to
correct.‖); Hashmi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 531 F.3d 256,
262 (3d Cir. 2008) (―[T]o the extent that the BIA‘s decision
rests in the alternative on its own finding of fact . . ., it erred.‖
(footnote omitted)).
As of June 2005, when the IJ first heard Galdamez‘s
case, the only BIA decision discussing ―social visibility‖ was
In re R-A-, and that opinion had been vacated in early 2001.
In re C-A-, with its enhanced definition of ―particularity‖ and
application of the ―social visibility‖ requirement, was not
published as precedential until June 15, 2006, exactly one
year after the IJ rejected Galdamez‘s petition. Thus,
Galdamez had no reason to present evidence or argue facts
relating to, for instance, whether ―he possesses any
characteristics that would cause others in Honduran society to
recognize him as one who has refused gang recruitment‖ or
whether his proposed group is too ―large and diffuse‖ to be
considered ―particular.‖ Nor did the IJ have any reason to
make factual findings on these points.
On remand from our 2007 decision, the BIA papered
over the lack of factual development by relying on factual
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findings made in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-,
both of which also post-dated Galdamez‘s hearing before the
IJ. The only ―evidence‖ to which the BIA cited for its
―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ findings were quotations
from those cases, coupled with conclusory statements that the
same facts apply to Galdamez‘s case. For instance, the BIA
quoted Matter of E-A-G- at length for propositions such as:
―[T]here is no showing that membership in a larger body of
persons resistant to gangs is of concern to anyone in
Honduras, including the gangs themselves.‖ Id. (quoting
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594–95). I pass no
judgment on the truth of this statement or its application in
Matter of E-A-G-, but I do not accept its blanket application
to Galdamez‘s case, where the evidentiary record was not
developed with any notion of ―particularity‖ or ―social
visibility‖ requirements. It remains to be seen whether
Galdamez might be able to produce testimony, affidavits, or
some other evidence not presented by the applicants in Matter
of S-E-G- or Matter of E-A-G-.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), the IJ is the
factfinder.
Here, the BIA implicitly determined that
Galdamez is identically situated to the asylum applicants in
Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-, and that he would be
unable to show ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ because
those two earlier applicants were unable to do so. That may
be true, but that decision is for the IJ in the first instance. If,
on remand, the BIA does change course and adopts new rules
for asylum applicants, it must also remand Galdamez‘s case
to the IJ for additional factfinding. Galdamez‘s appeal before
the BIA should not be limited by an evidentiary record
compiled under an outdated law, or by the facts and
arguments raised by other applicants in cases other than his
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own. He should have the opportunity to present evidence
with an eye towards the law under which his case is being
decided.
III
In sum, I agree with the Majority that a remand is in
order. The BIA now has a choice of either remaining faithful
to its precedents or adopting new requirements that would
likely produce different outcomes for future applicants
claiming to be members of the same ―particular social
groups‖ as were recognized in earlier Board decisions. If it
chooses the latter course, I would also instruct the BIA to
remand the matter to the IJ so Galdamez can have a full and
fair opportunity to be heard under the new legal standards.
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